The present article proposes an integration between cultural psychology and developmental science. Such an integration would draw on the cultural-psychology principle of culture-psyche interactions, as well as on the developmental-science principle of person↔︎context relations. Our proposed integration centers on acculturation, which is inherently both cultural and developmental. Specifically, we propose that acculturation is governed by specific transactions between the individual and the cultural context, and that different types of international migrants (e.g., legal immigrants, undocumented immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, crisis migrants) (...) encounter quite different culture-psyche interactions and person↔︎context relations. We outline the ways in which various acculturation-related phenomena, such as acculturation operating at macro-level versus micro-level time scales, can be viewed through cultural and developmental lenses. The article concludes with future directions in research on acculturation as an intersection of cultural and developmental processes. (shrink)

Whitehead does not provide us with a systematic account of the various types of experience to which the word “memory” is applied. Nevertheless, he does provide us with a way of understanding the world, and living creatures who inhabit it, that places the discussion in a different context from the usual one: the diverse features of human experience that we call memory are developed forms of basic patterns of relationship that characterize all actual entities. I will first review the relevant (...) features of Whitehead's conceptuality, then contrast the resulting view with its usual formulation, and then speculate about some forms of memory in Whiteheadian categories. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider three arguments for the irrelevance of the doctrine of double effect in end-of-life decision making. The third argument is our own and, to that extent, we seek to defend it. The first argument is that end-of-life decisions do not in fact shorten lives and that therefore there is no need for the doctrine in justification of these decisions. We reject this argument; some end-of-life decisions clearly shorten lives. The second is that the doctrine of double (...) effect is not recognized in UK law ; therefore, clinicians cannot use it as the basis for justification of their decisions. Against this we suggest that while the doctrine might have dubious legal grounds, it could be of relevance in some ways, e.g. in marking the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable practice in relation to the clinician's duty to relieve pain and suffering. The third is that the doctrine is irrelevant because it requires there to be a bad effect that needs justification. This is not the case in end-of-life care for patients diagnosed as dying. Here, bringing about a satisfactory dying process for a patient is a good effect, not a bad one. What matters is that patients die without pain and suffering. This marks a crucial departure from the double-effect doctrine; if the patient's death is not a bad effect then the doctrine is clearly irrelevant. A diagnosis of dying allows clinicians to focus on good dying and not to worry about whether their intervention affects the time of death. For a patient diagnosed as dying, time of death is rarely important. In our conclusion we suggest that acceptance of our argument might be problematic for opponents of physician-assisted death. We suggest one way in which these opponents might argue for a distinction between such practice and palliative care; this relies on the double-effect doctrine's distinction between foresight and intention. (shrink)

William Whewell raised a series of objections concerning John Stuart Mill’s philosophy of science which suggested that Mill’s views were not properly informed by the history of science or by adequate reflection on scientific practices. The aim of this paper is to revisit and evaluate this incisive Whewellian criticism of Mill’s views by assessing Mill’s account of Michael Faraday’s discovery of electrical induction. The historical evidence demonstrates that Mill’s reconstruction is an inadequate reconstruction of this historical episode and the scientific (...) practices Faraday employed. But a study of Faraday’s research also raises some questions about Whewell’s characterization of this discovery. Thus, this example provides an opportunity to reconsider the debate between Whewell and Mill concerning the role of the sciences in the development of an adequate philosophy of scientific methodology.Keywords: Inductivism; Experiment; Theory; Methodology; Electromagnetism. (shrink)

Paper edition (unseen), $14.95. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

Reply to article 'Political Perception and Ensemble of Macro Objectives and Measures: The Paradox of the Index for Sustainable Economic Welfare' by Rafael Ziegler in Environmental Values vol.16 no.1, pp.43-60.

Reasoning under uncertainty, that is, making judgements with only partial knowledge, is a major theme in artificial intelligence. Professor Paris provides here an introduction to the mathematical foundations of the subject. It is suited for readers with some knowledge of undergraduate mathematics but is otherwise self-contained, collecting together the key results on the subject, and formalising within a unified framework the main contemporary approaches and assumptions. The author has concentrated on giving clear mathematical formulations, analyses, justifications and consequences of the (...) main theories about uncertain reasoning, so the book can serve as a textbook for beginners or as a starting point for further basic research into the subject. It will be welcomed by graduate students and research workers in logic, philosophy, and computer science as a textbook for beginners, a starting point for further basic research into the subject, and not least, an account of how mathematics and artificial intelligence can complement and enrich each other. (shrink)

“Neo-inclusivism” is explained and assessed as an approach to the problem of the conflicting claims to truth of different religions, with reference to inter alia John B. Cobb (Jr.), Gavin D'Costa and Paul Ingram. For the neo-inclusivist the truth of a religious tradition depends on its inclusivistic capacity, i.e. its capacity to assimilate other traditions. For ex ample, by being enriched and transformed through “radical openness” to other traditions, while remaining “committed” to her own tradition – so the neo-inclusivist (...) claims – the theology of the Christian can become “truly global”. Neo-inclusivism seemingly transcends the absolutist habits of inclusivists, i.e. to assess the religious other in view of criteria (the inclusivist's own religious tradition) with which the other does not identify himself or herself. However, the neo-inclusivist plays down the possible limits of inter religious openness and is overly optimistic about the possibility of a “truly global” theology. Moreover, whether the neo-inclusivist's “committed openness” significantly differs from the approach of those who arbitrarily use the definitive norms of their own religious tradition to assess other traditions, is at least debatable. Whatever the case may be, insofar as tolerance cannot tolerate intolerance, the neo-inclusivist is necessarily intolerant, and, in this sense, “absolutist”, towards those who make their own beliefs normative for all and shun themselves from the assessments and new insights of others. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.23(1) 2004: 82-107. (shrink)

Burkle examines various philosophical suggestions that God is not an existing reality. Hegel, Sartre, and Henry Dumery are selected as representative of the position Burkle calls "antitheism." What is common to all of the antitheists is that objective existence is denied to God, or that the category of existence itself is an ambiguous one when ascribed to God. Burkle argues that one cannot divorce the concept of human existence from a concept of the "other," or God, or some notion of (...) transcendence, of that which is beyond man. The author argues that neither Hegel, Sartre, or Dumery were capable of doing that. The solution to the problem Burkle finds in the philosophical constructions of Whitehead and Hartshorne. This book promises to be as important a theological work as Shubert Ogden's The Reality of God or John B. Cobb's Natural Theology.--W. A. J. (shrink)

One usually identifies a particular collection of geometric objects with the models of general relativity. But within this standard collection lurk ‘physically unreasonable’ models of spacetime. If such models are ruled out, attention can be restricted to some sub-collection of ‘physically reasonable’ models which can be considered a variant theory of general relativity. Since we have yet to identify a privileged sub-collection of ‘physically reasonable’ models, it is helpful to think of ‘general relativity’ in a pluralistic way; we can study (...) a collection of such ‘physically reasonable’ collections of models. (shrink)

John–Michael Kuczynski says the “paradox of analysis” can be resolved with the proper definition of “partial knowledge.” He says that this definition will not do: (K) S has partial knowledge of x = dfS knows some, but not all, of x’s parts. He offers an alternative account of incomplete or partial knowledge. I argue here that: (a) Kuczynski’s chief criticisms of (K) are defective; (b) his proposed solution to the paradox of analysis has no clear application to the paradox in (...) its familiar forms; and (c) his solution may not avoid the puzzle about partial knowledge it was designed to resolve. (shrink)

We discuss some recent work by Tim Maudlin concerning Black Hole Information Loss. We argue, contra Maudlin, that there is a paradox, in the straightforward sense that there are propositions that appear true, but which are incompatible with one another. We discuss the significance of the paradox and Maudlin's response to it.

This article shows a clear sense in which general relativity allows for a type of ‘machine’ that can bring about a spacetime structure suitable for the implementation of ‘supertasks’. 1Introduction2Preliminaries3Malament–Hogarth Spacetimes4Machines5Malament–Hogarth Machines6Conclusion.

In the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant presented a method for discovering what morality requires us to do in any situation and claimed that it is a method everyone can use. The method consists in testing one's maxim against the requirement stated in the formulations of the categorical imperative. There has been endless discussion of the adequacy of Kant's method in giving moral guidance, but there has been little effort to situate Kant's view of ethical method in its (...) historical context. In this paper I try to do so. I take the label "method of ethics" from the work of Henry Sidgwick. A method of ethics, he says, is any rational procedure by which we determine what it is right for an individual to do or what an individual ought to do. Since the moralists I want to consider do not all think of morality as rational, I shall broaden the notion by saying that a method is any systematic or regular procedure, rational or not, by which we determine what morality requires... (shrink)

Biologists have long theorized about the evolution of life cycles, meiosis, and sexual reproduction. We revisit these topics and propose that the fundamental difference between life cycles is where and when multicellularity is expressed. We develop a scenario to explain the evolutionary transition from the life cycle of a unicellular organism to one in which multicellularity is expressed in either the haploid or diploid phase, or both. We propose further that meiosis might have evolved as a mechanism to correct for (...) spontaneous whole‐genome duplication (auto‐polyploidy) and thus before the evolution of sexual reproduction sensu stricto (i.e. the formation of a diploid zygote via the fusion of haploid gametes) in the major eukaryotic clades. In addition, we propose, as others have, that sexual reproduction, which predominates in all eukaryotic clades, has many different advantages among which is that it produces variability among offspring and thus reduces sibling competition. (shrink)

The role of microaggressions has gained increasing philosophical attention in recent years. However, microaggressions only tell part of the story. An often-overlooked component of inequality is the uneven and unjust distribution of microaffirmations. In this paper, I give a new definition of microaffirmations as signals that a recipient belongs to some valued or high-status class. Microaffirmations can—but need not—lead individuals to gain a sense of confidence, belonging, and merit. I then explain the harms of microaffirmations, arguing that when microaffirmations are (...) distributed inequitably, they can have larger ramifications for injustice, harming some vulnerable groups more than others. In addition, microaffirmations can lead individual actors to make choices based on who gives them microaffirmations and where they receive them, and thus can have outsized influence over the direction of an individual’s life because individuals tend to migrate to where they feel valued, appreciated, and included. I then turn to solutions to the problems I raise. I argue we should attend to and attempt to rectify inequalities in microaffirmations because doing so can help ensure not just the absence of negative attention, but also that the presence of positive attention is flowing in a just and equitable way. (shrink)

This book, first published in 1938, is based on the Muirhead Lectures given at Birmingham University in February and March of 1937. The first half of this book is mainly devoted to an exposition of the principles of genetics, whilst the second half deals with more controversial topics, with the text providing an insight into the ideology of the time. This title will be of interest to students of politics and history.

We investigate the relative probabilistic support afforded by the combination of two analogies based on possibly different, structural similarity (as opposed to e.g. shared predicates) within the context of Pure Inductive Logic and under the assumption of Language Invariance. We show that whilst repeated analogies grounded on the same structural similarity only strengthen the probabilistic support this need not be the case when combining analogies based on different structural similarities. That is, two analogies may provide less support than each would (...) individually. (shrink)